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INTRODUCTION
When deciding whether a challenged governmental practice
violates the Establishment Clause, courts must first ask whether the
practice has been historically accepted throughout United States
history.1 If looking to the historical background of the practice cannot
resolve the question, only then may courts look to other Establishment
Clause tests set forth by the Supreme Court, such as the endorsement,
coercion, and purpose tests.2 In Freedom from Religion Foundation,
Inc. v. Concord Community Schools, the Seventh Circuit skipped this
 J.D. candidate, May 2019, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology. The author would like to thank Professors Steven Heyman, Mary Rose
Strubbe, Kent Streseman, and Hal Morris for teaching her everything she knows
about legal writing and for helping her develop a passion for Constitutional Law.
1
Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014) (stating that “[t]he
Establishment Clause must be interpreted by reference to historical practices and
understandings” (internal citations omitted)); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
688, 673 (1984) (the Establishment Clause must “comport[] with what history
reveals was the contemporaneous understanding of its guarantees”); Smith v.
Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 788 F.3d 580, 589, 604 (2015).
2
Smith, 788 F.3d at 602-3.
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first step and did not use the historical approach set forth in Town of
Greece.3 By sidestepping this recent Supreme Court precedent, the
Seventh Circuit misapplied important Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. Because Town of Greece signaled a “sea change in
constitutional law,”4 in the future, the Seventh Circuit should use the
historical approach when analyzing whether the Establishment Clause
is violated.
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”5
To interpret this clause, the Supreme Court has “employed at least
three ways to assess whether a local governmental body, such as a
school, violates the Establishment Clause: the endorsement, coercion,
and purpose tests.”6 Establishment Clause jurisprudence is widely
criticized by Justices, judges, and academics.7 The Lemon test is one
3

885 F.3d 1038 (7th Cir. 2018).
Smith, 788 F.3d at 602 (Batchelder, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the result) (stating that “[w]hen the Supreme Court signals a sea change in
constitutional law, I do not believe that we can lightly set it aside in a case
implicating the same constitutional provision…Therefore…Town of Greece should
inform our analysis here.”).
5
U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
6
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (stating that “the Constitution
guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in
religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which ‘establishes a [state] religion
or religious faith, or tends to do so.”’ (emphasis added)); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 678 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (“What is crucial is that a
government practice not have the effect of communicating a message of
government endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only practices having that
effect, whether intentionally or unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality
or public perception, to status in the political community.” (emphasis added));
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971) (setting forth the purpose test
and stating that “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster an ‘excessive government entanglement with
religion.” (emphasis added)).
7
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(declining to apply the Lemon and endorsement tests and stating that “I see no testrelated substitute for the exercise of legal judgment”); id. at 694 (Thomas, J.
4
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of the most widely used but highly criticized tests.8 Federal circuit
courts have struggled to consistently apply the Lemon test, and one
circuit court has recently abandoned the test all together.9 The
Supreme Court itself departed from its use of the Lemon test in Town
of Greece v. Galloway.10 In its place, the Court used a historical
approach along with the coercion test to determine whether the Town
of Greece could allow volunteer chaplains to open each legislative
session with a prayer.11
concurring) (“[T]he incoherence of the Court's decisions in this area renders the
Establishment Clause impenetrable and incapable of consistent application.”); Cnty.
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 669 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(criticizing endorsement test “flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in
practice”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(discussing “the type of unprincipled decision making that has plagued our
Establishment Clause cases since Everson”); Eric Rassbach, Town of Greece v.
Galloway: The Establishment Clause and the Rediscovery of History, 2014 CATO S.
CT. REV. 71, 78 (2013-2014) (citing Utah Highway Patrol Ass'n v. Am. Atheists,
Inc., 132 S.Ct. 12, 12-23 (2011) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.)
(collecting cases and criticizing Lemon and endorsement tests)); Jay A. Sekulow &
Francis J. Manion, The Supreme Court and the Ten Commandments: Compounding
the Establishment Clause Confusion, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 33, 33
(2005) (discussing “the fog obscuring . . . Establishment Clause jurisprudence
generally”).
8
Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671
(1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing Tp., 330
U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (describing the Lemon test as “blurred, indistinct and variable”));
William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It” The Supreme Court and
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 497 (the role of the Lemon test to resolve any
establishment inquiry “is ambiguous. At times the Court has described the test as a
helpful signpost, at other times the Court has suggested that it can be discarded in
certain circumstances, at still other times the Court has held that it must be
rigorously applied.”).
9
New Doe Child #1 v. U.S., 901 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2018).
10
See generally Town of Greece N.Y. v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014);
Karthik Ravishankar, The Establishment Clause’s Hydra: The Lemon Test in the
Circuit Courts, 41 U. DAYTON L. REV. 261, 266 (2016) (explaining that “in Town of
Greece v. Galloway, a divided Court affirmed another town’s legislative prayer
practice without invoking Lemon, again applying the reasoning from Marsh by
analyzing the setting of the prayer and its intended audience.”).
11
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575-576.
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In Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Concord
Community Schools, the Seventh Circuit did not explicitly use the
historical approach set forth in Town of Greece, the Supreme Court’s
most recent Establishment Clause case.12 Chief Judge Wood wrote the
majority opinion and used three other Establishment Clause tests to
find there was no Establishment Clause violation.13 The Court
concluded under all three tests that a holiday program at issue was not
impermissibly coercive, did not have an unlawful religious purpose,
and a reasonable observer would not have viewed the program as a
religious endorsement.14 However, not all the judges on the Seventh
Circuit agreed with which Establishment Clause test or tests should be
applied. In Concord, Judge Frank Easterbrook concurred in the
judgment, but disagreed with the use and application of coercion test.15
The Supreme Court has given inconsistent guidance and has not
explicitly overruled any Establishment Clause tests. The Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Concord highlights the confusion among courts
the Establishment Clause has created. The Eighth Circuit recently
broke free from the Lemon test, becoming the first court of appeals to
use the Supreme Court’s historical approach set forth in Town of
Greece v. Galloway.16 Now that the Eighth Circuit has left the Lemon
test behind, a shift in the federal courts Establishment Clause
jurisprudence may occur. As the Eighth Circuit noted, Town of Greece
is a “major doctrinal shift in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”17
While the Supreme Court has developed multiple tests for analyzing
the Establishment Clause, it has never adopted one clear test.18
Whether the circuit courts will continue to use the coercion, purpose,
12

885 F.3d 1038, 1045-46 (7th Cir. 2018).
Id.
14
Id. at 1053.
15
Id. at 1038.
16
New Doe Child #1 v. United States, 901 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2018).
17
Id. at 1028 (internal quotations omitted).
18
See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 869 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(explaining that “[i]n all the years of its effort, the Court has isolated no single test of
constitutional sufficiency”).
13
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and endorsement tests, or resort to the reasoning of the Supreme Court
in Town of Greece, is uncertain. However, until the Supreme Court
clearly defines Establishment Clause jurisprudence by mandating one
specific test, it is unlikely the Seventh Circuit will completely abandon
any of the three older tests.
This note argues that federal circuit courts must follow the
Supreme Court’s most recent guidance in Town of Greece. Courts
must look to historical meaning, when applicable, to determine
whether a challenged governmental action violates the Establishment
Clause. Only then can courts look to other Establishment Clause tests,
such as the endorsement, purpose, and coercion tests. This note will
first explain the history of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and the
various tests the Supreme Court has set forth. Second, this note will
survey the different circuit court approaches to the Establishment
Clause tests, in particular the Seventh Circuit and Eighth Circuit. Last,
this note will analyze the benefits of using the historical method and
suggest that courts should look to history, coupled with another
Establishment Clause test if necessary, to evaluate whether a
constitutional violation has occurred.
A. The History of the Establishment Clause
1. Early Establishment Clause History
When looking at a challenged governmental practice, the Supreme
Court’s early Establishment Clause jurisprudence analyzed the history
of disputed practices to determine whether a constitutional violation
had occurred.19 In Everson v. Board of Education, the majority stated
that the Establishment Clause should be interpreted in “light of its
history.”20 Even the dissent agreed with this approach, commenting
that “[n]o provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given
content by its generating history than the religious clause of the First
19

Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1947)
(discussing the importance of the separation between church and state).
20
Id. at 14-15.
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Amendment.”21 For the following two decades, the Supreme Court
based its Establishment Clause findings on historical practices and
understandings.22
For example, in 1961, the Supreme Court considered whether a
Maryland criminal statute which proscribed labor, business, and other
commercial activities on Sundays violated the Establishment Clause.23
Appellants argued that “Sunday is the Sabbath day of the predominant
Christian sects [and] the purpose of the enforced stoppage of labor on
that day is to facilitate and encourage church attendance.”24 In its
analysis, the Supreme Court stated that the history of Sunday Closing
Laws in the United States was relevant to whether the statutes respect
an establishment of religion.25 The Court looked as far back as
colonial and English legislation, and observed that “English Sunday
legislation was in aid of the established church.”26 However, the Court
acknowledged that in recent times, there were “secular justifications
[that] have been advanced for making Sunday a day of rest.”27 The
Court held that the Sunday Closing Laws did not violate the
Establishment Clause because “most of them, at least, are of a secular
rather than of a religious character, and that presently they bear no
21

Id. at 33. (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (explaining that “the history, purpose, and operation of real
property tax exemptions for religious organizations must be examined to
determine whether the Establishment Clause is breached by such
exemptions.”) (citing School Dist. of Abington Tp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 293 (1963)); McGowan v. State of Md., 366 U.S. 420, 431 (1961)
(explaining that an “inquiry into the history of Sunday Closing Laws in our
country, in addition to an examination of the Maryland Sunday closing
statutes in their entirety and of their history, is relevant to the decision of
whether the Maryland Sunday law in question is one respecting an
establishment of religion”).
23
Id. at 422.
24
Id. at 431.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 432-33.
27
Id. at 434.
22
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relationship to establishment of religion as those words are used in the
Constitution of the United States.”28
In 1963, the Court in Abington School District v. Schempp stated
that the line between “the permissible and impermissible is one which
accords with history and faithfully reflects the understanding of the
Founding Fathers.”29 In Abington, two state statutes providing for
Bible reading in public schools were held unconstitutional under the
Establishment Clause.30 Seven years later, the Supreme Court
analyzed the Establishment Clause under a historical approach again
in Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York.31 The issue in Walz
was whether property tax exemptions to religious organizations for
property used for religious worship violated the Establishment
Clause.32 Finding that there was “no genuine nexus between tax
exemption and establishment of religion,” the Court looked to an
earlier case, which stated that “a page of history is worth a volume of
logic.”33 The Court examined the governmental purpose for granting
tax exemptions to religious institutions, and found that there was no
strong case for finding this “historic practice” unconstitutional.34 As
evidenced by McGowan and Abington, the Supreme Court’s mid to
late twentieth century approach to the Establishment Clause was
historical.

28

Id. at 444.
374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963).
30
Id. at 223.
31
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
32
Id. at 666-68.
33
Id. at 675-76. (citing New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349
(1921) (Holmes, J.)).
34
Id. at 686-87.
29
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2. The Lemon Test
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court broke from its
traditional, historical approach and created a new Establishment
Clause test.35 In Lemon, the issue was whether two statutes that
provided state funding for non-public, religious schools violated the
Establishment Clause.36 A Rhode Island Program allowed the state to
provide a fifteen percent salary supplement to teachers who taught
secular subjects at religious schools.37 The Pennsylvania statute had a
similar reimbursement and also provided partial reimbursement for
secular materials in the religious schools.38 In an 8-1 decision, the
Court found the two Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes at issue
were unconstitutional.39
Striking down both statutes, the Court looked to its previous
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in Board of Education v. Allen
and Walz v. Tax Commission to develop the three prongs now known
as the Lemon test.40 The Lemon test asks whether the government’s
action (1) has a religious “purpose,” (2) has the “primary effect” of
“advancing” or “endorsing” religion; and (3) fosters “excessive
government entanglement with religion.”41 In Lemon, the Court
focused its analysis on the third prong, finding that the “cumulative

35

403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Id. at 606 (finding both statutes “unconstitutional under the Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment, as the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising
under the statutes involves excessive entanglement between government and
religion”).
37
Id. at 607.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 603.
40
Id. at 612-613 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 668
(1970) and Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
41
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 395 (1993) (explaining the Lemon test); see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971).
36
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impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes in each State
involves excessive entanglement between government and religion.”42
The Lemon test has been highly criticized for its malleability and
self-contradiction by courts and commentators.43 Many Supreme Court
Justices, past and present, are stark critics of the test.44 One of the
Lemon tests biggest critics was Justice Scalia. In his concurrence in
Lamb’s Chapel, Justice Scalia explained that “no fewer than five of
the currently sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, personally
driven pencils through the creature’s heart [the Lemon test], and a
sixth has joined an opinion doing so.”45 Justice Scalia refused to join

42

See id. at 613-614.
See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J.) (“As to the Court’s
invocation of the Lemon test: Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that
repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and
buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause Jurisprudence once again.”); Doe v.
Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 869-77 (7th Cir. 2012) (Easterbrook, J. &
Posner, J., dissenting from en banc decision) (stating that Lemon and the “no
endorsement” test are “hopelessly open-ended”); Jesse H. Choper, The
Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools—An Update, 75 CALIF. L. REV.
5 (1987).
44
See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J. and Thomas,
J., dissenting); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-57 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346-349
(1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 10713 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
45
508 U.S. at 398-99 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992)
(Scalia, J., joined by, inter alios, Thomas, J., dissenting); Allegheny County v.
American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 655–657
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346–349 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107–113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); id., at 90–91, 105 S.Ct. at 2507 (White, J., dissenting); School Dist. of
Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 400 (1985) (White, J., dissenting); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 282 (1981) (White, J., dissenting); New York v. Cathedral
Academy, 434 U.S. 125, 134–135 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Roemer v. Board of
Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J., concurring in
43
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the majority opinion in Lamb’s Chapel because of the use of the
Lemon test. While the Lemon test might first appear to be a simple
three-part test, the problem is that the Court itself is wishy washy
about how much deference it should be given. For example, in Hunt v.
McNair, the Court stated that the three-part test was “no more than
helpful signposts.”46 While the Lemon test was once the leading
method for challenges to the Establishment Clause, the test has caused
greater division than unity. Until five Justices of the Supreme Court
specifically abrogate the rule, the circuit courts will continue to use the
test.47
3. Revisiting the Historical Approach:
Marsh and Town of Greece
In Marsh v. Chambers and Town of Greece v. Galloway, the
Supreme Court returned to looking to history and traditional
understandings of challenged governmental practices in analyzing
whether legislative prayer violated the Establishment Clause.48 The
question in Marsh was whether the Nebraska Legislature’s practice of
opening each session with a prayer led by a chaplain, who was paid by
the state, violated the Establishment Clause.49 Writing for the majority,
Justice Berger held the Nebraska Legislature’s practice did not violate
the Establishment Clause.50 Instead of using the Lemon test, Justice
Burger relied on history and the intent of the Framers of the United
judgment); Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
820 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
46
413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
47
Eric Rassbach, Town of Greece v. Galloway: The Establishment Clause and
the Rediscovery of History, 2014 CATO S. CT. REV. 71, 78 (2013-2014).
48
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding the Nebraska
legislature’s practice of offering opening prayers); Town of Greece, N.Y. v.
Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014) (finding there was insufficient evidence that the
town had “intentionally excluded non-Christians from giving prayers at Town Board
meetings.”).
49
Id. at 784.
50
Id. at 787.
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States Constitution. Looking to the “unambiguous and unbroken
history of more than 200 years,” he stated that “the practice of opening
legislative sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our
society.”51
In 2014, the Supreme Court in Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway
again moved away from Lemon’s ahistorical analysis of the
Establishment Clause.52 Breaking free from the Lemon test, the Court
engaged in a historical analysis of legislative prayer, which dated back
to the time the Framers drafted the First Amendment.53 Citizens in
Greece, New York held town board meetings where a local clergyman
would give an invocation.54 A town employee would call local
religious institutions until she found a minister available for the
monthly meeting.55 The town did not exclude or deny any prospective
prayer-givers the opportunity, allowing ministers, laypersons, or even
atheists to give the invocation.56 However, all prayer-givers were
Christian.57 Two women, Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens, sued
the town, saying that the prayer practice preferred Christian prayer
over other religious and sponsored sectarian prayers.58
The question was whether the practice of opening town board
meetings with a prayer violated the Establishment Clause.59 The
Supreme Court looked to the history of legislative prayer and
recognized that “while religious in nature, [legislative prayer] has long
been understood as compatible with the Establishment Clause.”60 The
51

Id. at 792.
572 U.S. 565 (2014) (abrogating Alleghany v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
53
Id.
54
Id. at 570.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 572-3.
59
Id. at 570.
60
Id. at 576; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O’Connor,
J., concurring).
52
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appropriate test to be used, the Court said, “must acknowledge a
practice that was accepted by the Framers and has withstood the
critical scrutiny of time and political change.”61 Justice Kennedy also
used the coercion test and evaluated whether a reasonable observer
would think the prayers had a coercive tone or message.62 He
recognized that “the reasonable observer is acquainted with this
tradition and understand that its purposes are to lend gravity to public
proceedings and to acknowledge the place religion holds in the lives of
many private citizens, not to afford government an opportunity to
proselytize or force truant constituents into the pews.”63
In making its decision, the Court stated that “there can be no
doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with a prayer
has become part of the fabric of our society.”64 The Court stated “that
the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by reference to historical
practices and understandings.”65 Essentially, under Town of Greece,
any test under the Establishment Clause must look to history.66 In his
concurrence, Justice Alito further explained that the practice of
delivering a prayer at the beginning of each legislative session “was
well established and undoubtedly well known.”67 Any inconsistency
between Establishment Clause tests and the historic practice of
legislative prayer, “calls into question the validity of the test, not the
historic practice.”68
Ultimately, the Court decided that opening a town meeting with a
prayer comported with tradition and was not coercive.69 Notably, the
61

added).

Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 472 U.S. 572, 577 (2014) (emphasis

62

Id. at 586-87. (citing County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659
(1989)) (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983)).
65
Id. at 565. (emphasis added).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 603.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 591-92.
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Court did not analyze the case using the Lemon test. Justice Breyer’s
dissent was the only part of the case to cite Lemon.70 In doing so, the
Court did not explicitly overrule the Lemon test or any other
Establishment Clause test.
Town of Greece created a two-pronged test. First, “[t]he
Establishment Clause must be interpreted by reference to historical
practices and understandings . . . Any test the Court adopts must
acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Framers and has
withstood the critical scrutiny of time and change.”71 Second, “[i]t is
an elemental First Amendment principle that government may not
coerce its citizens to support or participate in any religion or its
exercise.”72
4. The Endorsement Test
Justice O’Connor first proposed the Endorsement Test in her
concurring opinion in County of Allegheny v. ACLU and was approved
by a majority of the Court five years later in Lynch v. Donnelly.73
Justice O’Connor acknowledged that it is unclear “how the three parts
of the [Lemon] test relate to the principles enshrined in the
Establishment Clause.”74 Recognizing this, Justice O’Connor set forth
a method to analyze the Establishment Clause – the Endorsement Test
70

Id. at 614-15 (Breyer, S., dissenting) (citing to Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 622 (1971) and stating that “[t]he question in this case is whether the prayer
practice of the town of Greece, by doing too little to reflect the religious diversity of
its citizens, did too much, even if unintentionally, to promote the “political division
along religious lines” that “was one of the principal evils against which the First
Amendment was intended to protect.”).
71
Id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (internal citations omitted).
72
Id. at 586 (plurality opinion).
73
Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
(1989), abrogated on other grounds by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S.Ct. 1811
(2014) (holding a State’s practice of employing a legislative chaplain was
permissible); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(upholding a city’s holiday display of a crèche).
74
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689.
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– which asks whether “a government practice is perceived as an
endorsement of religion.”75 Said a different way, the question is
whether “the challenged governmental practice has . . . the purpose or
effect of ‘endorsing’ religion.”76
In County of Allegheny, the majority found that the display of a
menorah and a Christmas tree on public property was not an
impermissible governmental endorsement of Christianity and
Judaism.77 While the government “may celebrate Christmas in some
manner and form,” it may not endorse the Christian religion.78 While
the endorsement test has been used and accepted, like the Lemon test,
the endorsement test has not been without criticism.79 The Court in
Town of Greece did not use the endorsement test, but at the same time
did not abrogate endorsement test.80 Therefore, circuit courts continue
to apply the endorsement test.81
75

Id. at 689.
Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592 (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436
(1962)); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985) (using the endorsement
test to find a moment-of-silence statute was an endorsement of prayer activities).
77
Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 574.
78
Id. 601-602.
79
Id. at 574 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing the endorsement test and
stating that “[t]his Court's decisions, however, impose no such burden on
demonstrating that the government has favored a particular sect or creed, but, to the
contrary, have required strict scrutiny of practices suggesting a denominational
preference”).
80
Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 788 F.3d 580, 589 (6th Cir.
2015).
81
Id. (explaining that “Town of Greece gives no indication that the court
intended to completely displace the endorsement test. The opinion does not address
the general validity of the endorsement test at all; it simply explains why a historical
view was more appropriate in the case at hand. We therefore apply the endorsement
analysis here.”); see also Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Concord
Community Schools, 885 F.3d 1038, n.1 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Indeed, there is debate
among the Justices about the continuing validity of the endorsement test . . . at least
the dissenting Justices in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137
S.Ct. 2012 n.4 (2017), suggested that the endorsement test is still with us.” (internal
citations omitted)).
76

81
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5. The Coercion Test
Justice Kennedy formulated what is now known as the coercion
test. In Lee, public high schools and middle schools invited clergy to
give invocations and benedictions at graduation ceremonies.83 Writing
for the majority, Justice Kennedy found that the prayers conducted at
the graduations violated the Establishment Clause because they
effectively coerced students to support or participate in religion.84
The Court recognized that in elementary and secondary schools,
prayer exercises “carry a particular risk of indirect coercion.”85
Focusing on the indirect and peer pressure put on students to stand as a
group or be silent during the ceremony, the Court stated that “[i]t is
beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in
religion or its exercise.”86
In his dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the coercion test.87 He
stated that “[t]he coercion that was a hallmark of historical
establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of
financial support by force of law and threat of penalty.”88 He gave an
example of the Colony of Virginia, where the Church of England
forced ministers to deliver the doctrine and rites of the Church and all
persons were required to go to church and observe the Sabbath.89
Justice Scalia did not disagree with the general idea that the
government cannot coerce anyone to participate in religion, but he
stated that the concept of coercion must be coupled with a “threat of
82

82

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
Id.
84
Id. at 577-78.
85
Id. at 592. (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)); School Dist.
Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
86
Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
87
Id. at 640-41.
88
Id. 640. (emphasis in original).
89
Id. 641.
83

82
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penalty.”90 There was no specific threat of penalty at issue in Lee,
according to Justice Scalia.91 While the coercion test is not without its
critics, the Court’s use of the test in Town of Greece indicates that the
coercion test is still well and alive in the Court.92
B. Varying Circuit Court Applications of Establishment Clause Tests
What makes Establishment Clause jurisprudence different from
other constitutional issues is the open criticism of the area of law by
Supreme Court Justices and the courts of appeals.93 Because the
90

Id. at 642. (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (citing American Jewish Congress v.
Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 132 (7th Cir. 1987)).
91
Id.
92
572 U.S. 565, 584-87 (2014) (“The town of Greece does not violate the First
Amendment by opening its meetings with prayer that comports with our tradition
and does not coerce participation by nonadherents.” (emphasis added)).
93
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(declining to apply the Lemon and endorsement tests and stating that “I see no testrelated substitute for the exercise of legal judgment”); id. at 694 (Thomas, J.
concurring) (“[T]he incoherence of the Court's decisions in this area renders the
Establishment Clause impenetrable and incapable of consistent application.”);
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 768 n.3
(1995) (plurality opinion, Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy and
Thomas, JJ.) (“[The endorsement test] supplies no standard whatsoever . . . It is
irresponsible to make the Nation's legislators walk this minefield.”); Cnty. of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 669 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing
endorsement test “flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice”); Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing “the type
of unprincipled decision making that has plagued our Establishment Clause cases
since Everson”); Eric Rassbach, Town of Greece v. Galloway: The Establishment
Clause and the Rediscovery of History, 2014 CATO S. CT. REV. 71, 81-82 (20132014) (citing Utah Highway Patrol Ass'n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 12, 12-23
(2011) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (collecting cases and
criticizing Lemon and endorsement tests); Jay A. Sekulow & Francis J. Manion, The
Supreme Court and the Ten Commandments: Compounding the Establishment
Clause Confusion, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 33, 33 (2005) (discussing “the fog
obscuring . . . Establishment Clause jurisprudence generally”); Douglas G.
Smith, The Establishment Clause: Corollary of Eighteenth-Century Corporate
Law?, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 239, 294 (2003) (explaining that the Court's Establishment

83
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Supreme Court has set forth so many different tests, lower courts are
tasked with sifting through the weeds of Supreme Court decisions to
figure out which test to use. The Seventh Circuit in Concord applied
three prominent tests, the purpose (Lemon test), endorsement, and
coercion tests, to determine whether an Establishment Clause violation
occurred.94 But, the court failed to follow the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Town of Greece, which says that courts must apply a
historical analysis in deciding Establishment Clause cases.95 On the
other hand, the Eighth Circuit in New Doe Child #1 v. U.S. declined to
use the Lemon test entirely and opted for the Town of Greece historical
approach.96 With the Seventh Circuit departing from recent Supreme
Court precedent, and the Eighth Circuit leaving many of the old tests
behind, Establishment Clause jurisprudence is more unclear than ever.
1. The Seventh Circuit’s Approach
The most significant problem with the modern state of the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause is how it
leaves lower courts to decide which test to use.97 Because of the wide
variety of applicable tests, different results are reached using different
tests. The Seventh Circuit has not been immune from this problem.
Judges on the Seventh Circuit have recognized this juggling act – with
multiple tests, comes multiple choices and outcomes.

Clause jurisprudence is “confused”); William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We
See It” The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 495
(1986) (“From the outset it has been painfully clear that logical consistency and
establishment clause jurisprudence were to have little in common.”).
94
Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Concord Community Schools,
885 F.3d 1038 (7th Cir. 2018).
95
Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014).
96
New Doe Child #1 v. U.S., 901 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2018).
97
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 857 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(noting how “there remains the question of which of the two irreconcilable strands of
our Establishment Clause jurisprudence we should now follow.”).
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As the Seventh Circuit noted in Freedom from Religion
Foundation, Inc. v. Concord Community Schools, Supreme Court
Justices have also been critical of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.98 In Concord, Chief Judge Wood analyzed whether the
Establishment Clause was violated under all three of the Supreme
Court’s approaches: the endorsement, coercion, and purpose tests.99
The issue in Concord was whether a public high school’s holiday
show violated the Establishment Clause.100 Through the Freedom
From Religion Foundation, Inc., a high school student and his father
brought a suit against a public school corporation.101 Concord High
School’s “Christmas Spectacular,” was a holiday show that had “a
particular focus on Christmas.”102 There were two parts to the show.103
The first half varied from year to year, but showcased non-religious
songs and dances, which were tied to an annual theme.104 The second
half, the section which was disputed, involved a 20-minute section
called “The Story of Christmas.”105 In this segment, there were
“religious songs interspersed with a narrator reading passages from the
New Testament.”106 At the end of the act, students posed in a nativity
scene.107

98

Concord, 885 F.3d at 1045 (citing Elmbrook Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 134
S. Ct. 2283 (2014) and noting that in their dissents, Justices Scalia and
Thomas expressed the view that the Supreme Court has rejected the
endorsement test) (citing Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v.
Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2031 n.4 (2017) and stating that the dissenting
Justices in Trinity suggested that the endorsement test is still relevant).
99
Concord, 885 F.3d at 1045.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 1041-42.
102
Id. at 1041.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 1042.
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Because they took issue with the second half of the show,
Plaintiffs brought suit against the school, asking for declaratory and
injunctive relief.108 Plaintiffs also asked for a preliminary injunction to
prevent the school from showcasing the second half of the 2014 show
in the upcoming December 2015 show.109 In response, Concord
offered to make two changes to the proposed version of the 2015
show: it would remove the scriptural reading from the nativity scene,
and add two songs, “Ani Ma’amin” and “Harambee,” to represent
Hanukkah and Kwanzaa.110 The district court judge held that these
changes were not enough to “address the Establishment Clause
problems,” and granted the preliminary injunction.111 After, Concord
adopted further changes to the show.112 They added Hanukkah and
Kwanzaa songs, showed a two minute nativity scene with mannequins
as opposed to students, and cut out the New Testament readings.113
Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the district court held
that the 2015 show did not violate the Establishment Clause, granting
partial summary judgment in favor of Concord.114
On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that even with the changes to the
second half of the Christmas Spectacular, the show still violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.115 The Court walked
through each of the three Supreme Court’s tests to determine whether
there had been a violation of the Establishment Clause.116 The Court
analyzed the Christmas Spectacular under the endorsement, coercion,
and purpose tests.117 Ultimately, the Court found that under any of the

108

Id.
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 1044.
114
Id. at 1045.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 1045-46.
117
Id.
109
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tests, Concord’s 2015 show did not violate the Establishment
Clause.118
When analyzing the Christmas Spectacular under the “purpose”
test, the Seventh Circuit looked to the test’s root: Lemon v.
Kurtzman.119 Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit did not explicitly call
its method the Lemon test, but it did reference the case.120 Under the
Seventh Circuit’s purpose test, the “practice is unconstitutional if it
lacks a secular objective.”121 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the primary purposes of the holiday program were
entertainment and pedagogy, not religion.122
Concurring in the judgment, Judge Easterbrook stated that while
he agreed the performance should be upheld, the court should have
done so on other grounds.123 He explained that “as a matter of history
or constitutional text” a government does not establish “a religion
through an artistic performance that favorably depicts one or more
aspects of that religion’s theology or iconography.”124 Judge
Easterbrook further stated that “as both Lemon and the noendorsement approach are judicial creations rather than restatements
of the first amendment's meaning, they do not justify a claim by judges
to have the final word. I have made this point elsewhere, so I do not
present an extended argument here.”125
In Concord, the Seventh Circuit indicated in a few different ways
that it was refusing to use the Town of Greece historical test. First,
under the purpose test, the test does not require the court to “evaluate

118

Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1049.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 1050.
123
Id. at 1053.
124
Id.
125
Id. (citing Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 869 (7th
Cir. 2012)).
119
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the quality or sufficiency of the historical analysis at issue.”126 The
Court in Town of Greece mandated that courts use a historical analysis
to determine whether the challenged practice violated the
Establishment Clause.127 In defiance of sorts, Concord explicitly stated
that the purpose test is unrelated to challenged historical practices.
Second, and more importantly, the Concord court did not apply the
Town of Greece historical approach as one of its three methods in
analyzing an Establishment Clause challenge. Third, while using the
endorsement test, the Seventh Circuit did mention that a “reasonable
observer is aware of a situation’s history and context.”128 However,
merely mentioning that a practice’s history should be considered is not
enough to satisfy Town of Greece. Courts must actually engage in a
historical analysis according to Town of Greece.
In sum, the court in Concord disagreed about the validity of the
Lemon test and failed to use the most recently proposed Supreme
Court test set forth in Town of Greece at all. This indicates that there is
disagreement on the use of Supreme Court Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and reluctance to use the historical approach. Because of
the hodgepodge of Establishment Clause tests and questionability of
which tests are “live,” Judge Wood used the endorsement, purpose,
and coercion tests in her analysis. However, the court failed to cover
all the bases when it did not use the historical approach set forth in
Town of Greece.
2. The Eighth Circuit’s Approach
In New Doe Child #1 v. U.S., the Eighth Circuit became the first
circuit court to decline to use the Lemon test entirely.129 In New Doe,
126

Id. (citing Books v. Elkhart Cty., Ind., 401 F.3d 857, 866 (7th Cir. 2005))
(explaining that “[t]he purpose prong of the Lemon test does not require us to
evaluate the quality or sufficiency of the historical analysis embodied in the County's
display.”).
127
Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 572 (2014).
128
Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Concord Community Schools,
885 F.3d 1038, 1046 (7th Cir. 2018).
129
901 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2018).
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the Court recognized that this was the first time the circuit had
analyzed an Establishment Clause issue since “the guidance of new
Supreme Court precedent” in Town of Greece.130 The Eighth Circuit
acknowledged that the Supreme Court had set forth numerous
Establishment Clause tests, but had failed to commit to any specific
one.131
The issue in New Doe Child #1 was whether placing the national
motto on money violated the Establishment Clause.132 Looking to the
Supreme Court’s most recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the
Eighth Circuit noted Town of Greece’s “unequivocal directive: ‘[T]he
Establishment Clause must be interpreted by reference to historical
practices and understandings.”133 In deciding which test to use, the
New Doe Child #1 court acknowledged the major doctrinal shift since
Town of Greece.134 The court stated that “[g]iven (1) Galloway’s
unqualified directive that the Establishment Clause “must” be
interpreted according to historical practices and understandings, (2) its
emphasis that this historical approach is not limited to a particular
factual context; and (3) the absence of any reference to other tests in
the Court’s opinion, we agree” that there has been a “major doctrinal
shift in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”135
In using Town of Greece’s historical approach, the Eighth Circuit
asked two questions. First, what do the historical practices at hand
“indicate about the constitutionality of placing the national motto on
money?”136 And second, is the placement of the national motto on
130

Id. at 1019 (citing Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
Id. (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678-79 (1984) and Van Orden
v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
132
Id. at 1018-19.
133
Id. at 1020 (citing Town of Greece, N.Y., v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 566
(2014).
134
Id. (citing Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 847 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir.
2017) (Kelly, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) and Smith v.
Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 788 F.3d 580, 602 (6th Cir. 2015) (Batchelder,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the result)).
135
Id. (internal citations omitted).
136
Id. at 1021.
131
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money impermissibly coercive?137 The court looked to the history of
placing “In God We Trust” on U.S. money, which began in 1864.138
The court noted that the history of this practice was “unbroken” and
that the government is not required to purge itself “of all religious
reflection.”139 Ultimately, the court found that putting “In God We
Trust” on U.S. coins comported with historical practices.140
The court also supplemented it’s historical analysis by using the
coercion test.141 But, the court stated that it was unnecessary to “probe
the bounds of the coercion analysis in this case because it is even more
apparent than in Galloway that the Government does not compel
citizens to engage in a religious observance when it places the national
motto on money.”142 The Eighth Circuit further clarified that historical
analysis is not the only test, but one of the most important ones: “In
other words, even when history indicates that a practice does not
offend the Establishment Clause, but the Court’s other Establishment
Clause tests suggest that it does, history alone cannot carry the day . . .
[and] history is now the single most important criterion when
evaluating Establishment Clause claims.”143
C. The Future of the Historical Approach
Town of Greece set forth a new approach to the Establishment
Clause: first analyze the practice under history, and if that still leaves
the constitutionality of the practice unresolved, then turn to the other
tests, most preferably the coercion test. Despite this guidance,
Establishment Clause jurisprudence continues to be a mishmosh of
137

Id.
Id.
139
Id. at 1022. (citing ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d
772, 778 (8th Cir. 2005).
140
Id. at 1023.
141
Id. (questioning “whether the appearance of ‘In God We Trust’ on U.S.
money is coercive.”).
142
Id. (citing Mayle v. U.S., 891 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2018)).
143
Id. at 1028 (Kelly, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
138
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tests. While some courts still use the Lemon test, its continuing
applicability is questionable. As Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh
Circuit noted, the Lemon test was “made up by the Justices during
recent decades.”144 The Eighth Circuit left behind the Lemon test in
favor of the historical approach and the coercion test. On the other
hand, the Seventh Circuit continues to use the Lemon test and fails to
use the historical approach. This begs the question, what is the future
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and in particular, the historical
approach?
In Concord, Judge Wood used a variety of Establishment Clause
tests.145 Using three tests, the court arrived at one conclusion: the
holiday show did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. To sufficiently expound the point that the holiday show
did not violate the Establishment Clause, it was a smart tactic to
employ multiple tests. Judge Wood recognized that there is
considerable disagreement about which test to employ, even among
the Supreme Court Justices.146 Using three tests was an attempt to
leave no doubt that no Establishment Clause violation had taken place.
However, the court in Concord did leave one puzzle piece
unsolved. Although Town of Greece marked a “major inflection point”
in Establishment Clause jurisprudence,147 the Seventh Circuit failed to
144

Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 869 (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting) (noting that the Lemon test is open-ended, lacks support in the text of
the First Amendment, and has no historical derivation); see also Card v. City of
Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2008) (Fernandez, J., concurring) (“The
still stalking Lemon test and the other tests and factors, which have floated to the top
of this chaotic ocean from time to time in order to answer specific questions, are so
indefinite and unhelpful that Establishment Clause jurisprudence has not been more
fathomable.”).
145
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Concord Community Schools,
885 F.3d 1038, 1045-46 (7th Cir. 2018) (examining “the Spectacular as performed in
2015 under each of the Court’s approaches.”).
146
Id.
147
Eric Rassbach, Town of Greece v. Galloway: The Establishment Clause and
the Rediscovery of History, 2014 CATO S. CT. REV. 71, 78 (2013-2014) (explaining
that “the process of historical examination that Town of Greece has set in motion
will continue to reshape how these cases are decided for years to come.”).
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use the historical approach. Town of Greece was decided in 2014,
making it one of the most recent Supreme Court cases examining the
First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.148 There are various reasons
why the Seventh Circuit may not have used the Town of Greece
historical approach. Nevertheless, the court should have applied the
most recent Supreme Court precedent, especially since Town of
Greece marked a strong departure from previous cases.
If one looks closely at the Concord opinion, the Seventh Circuit
used the word “history” on multiple occasions, potentially for the
purpose of superficially following Town of Greece.149 Looking to the
first paragraph of the opinion, Chief Judge Wood noted the history of
Christmas.150 She stated “[s]ince ancient times, people have been
celebrating the winter solstice.”151 Further, students have performed
the “Christmas Spectacular,” the holiday show at issue, for decades.152
The only significant time the court mentioned Town of Greece was in
a footnote concerning the validity of the endorsement test.153 The
Seventh Circuit noted that Town of Greece did not make it explicit
whether the endorsement test should still be used.154 But, a dissent in
Trinity v. Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer “suggested that the
endorsement test is still with us.”155 Semi-acknowledging the
historical method is not enough, the Seventh Circuit unmistakably
refrained from using the historical method.
It is unclear from the Concord opinion exactly why the Seventh
Circuit failed to use the historical method in Town of Greece. One
reason could be that court thought the holiday show at issue was not a
148

134 S.Ct. 1811 (2014).
Concord, 885 F.3d at 1048 (explaining that a “reasonable observer is aware
of a situation’s history and context and encompasses the views of adherents and nonadherents alike.”).
150
Id. at 1040-41.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 1041.
153
Id. at 1045, n. 1.
154
Id.
155
Id. (citing Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S.Ct.
2012, 2031 n.4 (2017)).
149
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“historical” practice per se, unlike the custom of beginning legislative
sessions with prayer. The show in Concord had a lot of moving parts,
including a nativity scene, Bible readings, and Christmas songs. There
was not one historical practice for the court to analyze. However, the
court could have looked to the history of Christmas and celebrating
holidays in the public sphere. For instance, Christmas is a national
holiday where the whole country takes the day off, and the Seventh
Circuit referred to it as a secular event.
The Town of Greece decision mandates courts to look to history
when analyzing whether a violation of the Establishment Clause has
occurred. Was the Seventh Circuit’s brief mentioning of the history of
the winter solstice and the decades old holiday show enough to satisfy
Town of Greece’s historical requirement? Likely not. The Christmas
Spectacular in Concord may not perfectly be a “historical practice,”
such as opening a legislative session with a prayer.156 This does not
offer the Seventh Circuit an excuse to ignore recent Supreme Court
precedent. At the very least, the Seventh Circuit should have
acknowledged the historical approach explained why the court was not
using it.
D. Why the Seventh Circuit Should (and Must) Employ the Historical
Approach
As a preliminary matter, it is important to recognize that the
Supreme Court’s language surrounding the historical approach in
Town of Greece is mandatory.157 The Court was clear that the
Establishment Clause must be interpreted according to historical
practices and understandings.158 Further, the Supreme Court
emphasized that the historical approach is not limited to any particular
factual context.159 Therefore, any Establishment Clause case that does
not use a historical approach violates the Supreme Court’s rule.
156

Town of Greece, 572 U.S. 565 (2014)
Id. at 566.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 566-67.
157
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The historical approach can help re-establish the Establishment
Clause. The historical approach is not without its critics, and certainly
is not a perfect test. The concurrence in Town of Greece noted that
“history alone cannot carry the day,” suggesting that the historical
approach should be combined with other Establishment Clause
tests.160 But, the benefit of using the historical method in Town of
Greece, in addition to other Establishment Clause tests, outweighs the
consistent problems with the Lemon test. History can serve as a source
of information and authority in Establishment Clause cases.
Looking to the use of history generally in American law, our
system is a precedent-based system and the Constitution, a 231-yearold document, is the root of the Establishment Clause. The history of a
practice can offer objectivity and authority.161 Using a historical
method can also support the idea that some aspects of religion in
government are acceptable. To some extent, it is impossible to remove
all religion from politics. Further, a historical approach offers an
external constraint on judicial subjectivity. As Erwin Chemerinsky
stated, judges “want very much to make it appear that their decisions
are not based on their personal opinions, but instead are derived from
an external source.”162
Other jurisprudence surrounding constitutional amendments
demonstrates the trend that the Court looks to history in evaluating
constitutionality of practices. As the Court noted in United States v.
Jones, to analyze the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the Court
must “assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted.”163 In evaluating the scope of the Sixth Amendment, the
160

Id.
See H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 660
(1987); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 864
(1989).
162
Erwin Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and the First
Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 908 (1993).
163
132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (analyzing whether attaching a GPS tracking
device to a vehicle and monitoring the vehicles movement was a search in violation
of the Fourth Amendment) (quoting Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
161
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Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey looked to “the practice of criminal
indictment, trial by jury, and judgment by court as it existed during the
years surrounding our Nation’s founding.”164 In the landmark Second
Amendment case District of Columbia v. Heller, both the majority and
the dissent of the Court used a historical approach in their opinions.
Justice Scalia looked to “the history that the founding generation
knew” when interpreting the meaning of the Second Amendment.165
This trend towards reliance on the Bill of Rights’ history demonstrates
that analysis on history is defined by what the Framers thought.
Because the Court uses history in evaluating other constitutional
amendments, it follows that the Court should do the same in analyzing
the Establishment Clause.
But on the other hand, history cannot resolve all problems. New
practices may not have a specific history for a court to analyze. For
instance, the Sixth Circuit in Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch.
Comm’rs recognized that in the case at hand, the “pure historical
approach” was “of limited utility.”166 There are problems that the
Framer’s might not have anticipated167 and historical practices may do
little to enlighten courts. As the Supreme Court noted, “an awareness
of history and an appreciation of the aims of the Founding Fathers do
not always resolve concrete problems.”168 The problem with relying
on history is that the times change, and so should our outlook on
governmental practices. Courts should not use history as a tool to

164

530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000).
554 U.S. 570, 598 (2008). In his dissent, Justice Stevens analyzed the
“contemporary concerns that animated the Framers.” Id. at 642.
166
788 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 2015) (stating that [i]n cases like this one that
cannot be resolved by resorting to historical practices, we do not believe that Town
of Greece requires us to depart from our pre-existing jurisprudence.”).
167
Id. (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 80 (1985) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
168
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 234 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
165
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legitimate governmental practices that are no longer acceptable and
would violate the Establishment Clause.169
But, the two-step test set forth in Town of Greece inherently takes
this problem into account. If history cannot resolve the question, then
courts may look to the endorsement, coercion, and purpose tests. The
Supreme Court in Town of Greece overtly gave greater weight to
history by mandating it be analyzed in Establishment Clause cases,
and therefore courts must look to history.170 The language in Town of
Greece directs lower courts to examine the history of a practice when
evaluating whether there has been a violation of the Establishment
Clause. If history can demonstrate that a practice is well-settled in
American history, no further test is necessary. But if history cannot
resolve the issue, then courts may turn to the other Establishment
Clause tests set forth by the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
Because Town of Greece did not explicitly overrule any of the
previous Establishment Clause tests, they are still fair game for lower
courts to cherry pick which one to use. What the Supreme Court has
made clear is that history must be taken into account in Establishment
Clause cases. When the Seventh Circuit decided Concord, it should
have recognized the historical approach in Town of Greece and
analyzed the history of the practice in regard to the Establishment
169

County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989) (“However
history may affect the constitutionality of nonsectarian references to religion by the
government, history cannot legitimate practices that demonstrate the government's
allegiance to a particular sect or creed .... The legislative prayers involved
in Marsh did not violate this principle because the particular chaplain had ‘removed
all references to Christ.’”).
170
See Paul Horwitz, The Religious Geography of Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 243, 246 (2014); Eric Rassbach, Town of Greece v
Galloway: The Establishment Clause and the Rediscovery of History, 2014 CATO S.
CT. REV. 71, 71 (2013-14) (explaining that Town of Greece’s historical approach
“marks a major inflection point in the development of the law of the Establishment
Clause”).
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Clause. By declining to do so, the court failed to follow Supreme
Court precedent that prescribes courts to look to history in
Establishment Clause cases. In the future, the Seventh Circuit must at
the very least acknowledge the historical approach explained in Town
of Greece, and if applicable, engage in a dialogue about whether a
historical practice comports with the Establishment Clause.
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